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Creativity, Risk and the Research Impact
Agenda in the United Kingdom
MICHAEL POWER
London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London
WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: m.k.power@lse.ac.uk
This article describes the recent requirement for UK universities to account for the
social and economic impact of their research, and asks whether this impact agenda
may change the conduct of research itself. Three critical issues are highlighted: the
epistemology of impact; the problem of quantifying qualities; and the likelihood of
impact growing in signiﬁcance and changing the landscape of research – so-called
‘impact creep’. Overall, the article identiﬁes some features of the research impact
agenda that pose risks to creativity and risk-taking by academics.
Introduction
The problem with creativity is that we do not really know what it is. Is it an input,
a process or some kind of outcome? Perhaps the moment we say what it is, it becomes
something else and we are dissatisﬁed – it cannot be grasped. The confusion is com-
pounded by neo-romantic notions of individualized creativity as if teams, groups and even
locations (cf. Silicon Valley) cannot be creative. And we often judge creativity because it
produces the outcomes that we like and legitimate as societies. Creativity is therefore as
much a function of collective social judgement and approbation as it is a thing in itself. Yet
despite these and many other problems with the concept of creativity, we don’t want to
give up on it. This is in part because it signiﬁes a distinctive conception of human agency at
its most noble, and in part because we think it is fragile and increasingly at risk.
It is not hard to ﬁnd this sense of pessimism in European academic life. It is widely
regarded as having becomemore ‘managerial’ over the last two decades and it is said that
creativity has been displaced by conservatism and standardization in both research and
teaching. But while this is a seductive narrative about academic life, and one that appeals
to a sense of loss and disenfranchisement, it is also one that requires critical challenge.
In this paper, the notion of creativity is replaced with that of risk-taking. It is not
that ‘risk-taking’ is any clearer than creativity as an idea. Even the idea of taking-risk
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is dependent on what is valued and what is regarded as being at risk. However, risk
provides a more limited and speciﬁc focus – both on the motivations of academics
(including career risk management) when they conduct research and importantly on
the institutional climates which inﬂuence those motivations. In short, the question is:
are universities places where intellectual risk-taking is encouraged and supported?
More speciﬁcally, is the pursuit of agendas encouraged where problem deﬁnition is
non-normal, where outcomes are highly uncertain and where use-value plays a lim-
ited role in systems of academic performance evaluation?
We should be careful about these questions. Kuhn’s famous distinction between
normal and revolutionary science has been the subject of much debate and philoso-
phical criticism, but from a policy point of view it reminds us that not all research can
be ‘risky’ revolutionary and paradigm changing and that much research is concerned
with the detailed working out and incremental extension of existing bodies of
knowledge within stable ‘epistemic communities’.1 Furthermore, we can never be
sure how to turn Kuhn’s historical thesis about the science into prescriptions for an
organization and for a division of scientiﬁc labour between the normal and the
abnormal. In my preferred terminology, how do we design and support a portfolio of
research with varying degrees of risk?
With these complexities in mind, this article explores the question of risk-taking
in research in the context of a recent speciﬁc reform to the governance of UK
universities, namely the requirement for UK academics to demonstrate the impact of
their research. The background and nature of this requirement are described in the
next section before a more critical analysis of three dimensions of the research impact
agenda: the epistemology of impact; the quantiﬁcation of quality; and impact creep.
The article concludes with some reﬂections on risk-taking in research in the face of the
impact requirement. This requirement may be a peculiar obsession of the British, but
it is likely that it will surface in other university systems and is therefore of wider
European relevance.
The Rise of ‘Impact’ as a Performance Value
The problem of how to link university research to national economic performance
has been a longstanding policy interest in the UK and many other nations.2 More
generally, policy-makers in developed economies have wrestled for many years with
the problem of how to measure whether public interventions are having desired
outcomes. Within a general public policy requirement to demonstrate ‘value for
money’, there has been a shift in focus from cost control to measurable outputs and,
ultimately, to harder to measure outcomes. In turn, this interest in outcomes has come
to be articulated in terms of impact, notably in the contexts of development and
environmental impact analysis.
Accordingly, before the publication in 2006 in the UK of the ‘Warry Report’,
which recommended that universities should measure the impact of their research
outside the academy, impact was already a legitimized policy value and goal.3
Following much negotiation, the recommendations of theWarry Report resulted in a
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new requirement for the 2014 UK Research Evaluation Exercise (hereafter
REF2014): 20% of funding for universities would be awarded for being able to
demonstrate ‘beneﬁcial impact’ deﬁned widely to include social and cultural beneﬁt
as well as economic. Impact could also be international and not simply for the beneﬁt
of the UK as originally envisaged. So, despite initial resistance and scepticism, impact
was established as a new performance norm for universities with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
consequences.
The initial policy ambition to develop metrics for impact gave way to a more
pragmatic approach by regulators and universities in which the ‘unit of account’
would be qualitative in form – the impact case study (ICS). Pilot studies were con-
ducted which led to the development of a standardized template for ICS production
but one that was pluralistic about the kinds of impact and the forms of evidence that
might support that claim for impact. As the implementation process progressed, there
was also a need to provide guidance for many detailed and complex issues relating to
such things as the time-window (in effect the accounting period) for impact and
boundary issues where individuals had moved from one university to another.
When it came to the detailed production of ICSs many academics found the new
requirement challenging. In contrast to starting with the research output itself, they
were forced to begin with the question ‘what has changed in the outside world as a
result of my research?’ Conversely, academics had to learn what impact ‘was not’.
For example, it was not a prestigious public lecture and it was not meeting with
practitioners to talk about their problems. These things might be regarded as
‘pathways to impact’ and part of ‘knowledge exchange’ but were not themselves
examples of impact. Accordingly, the writing of ICSs required many academics to
adopt a very new orientation to their work.4
In the end, REF2014 assessed the research of 154 UK universities involving over
190,000 research outputs from 52,000 staff, just under four outputs per staff
member.5 Signiﬁcantly, 6975 impact case studies were produced and evaluated,
amounting to one ICS for nearly every ninemembers of research active staff in theUK.
Importantly therefore, for the purposes of REF2014, not all research and researchers
were required to be ‘impactful’. Just as with the peer review of research in theREF2014
process, the thousands of ICSs for each subject area, and for universities as a whole,
were evaluated and graded for their quality (a scale of 1–4, where 4 is the highest
quality). Using these scores, league tables and rankings were produced by the Times
Higher Education magazine in the UK. Encouragingly perhaps, the Institute for
Cancer Research emerged as the most impactful organization. But there were also
subject-speciﬁc rankings for impact in the humanities, with Birmingham University
topping the table for philosophy, a discipline whose impact could reasonably be
assumed to emerge over centuries rather than a decade.6
The Epistemology of Impact
It might be assumed that the real problem of the impact agenda is that it is forcing
academic research work to be more practical in orientation, more focused on
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use-value than on fundamental values of curiosity-driven knowledge production as
such. This would be a mistake. Many ideas originating within the academy have
shaped common-sense thinking and practice in many different ﬁelds. Many academics
willingly disseminate their work to policy-makers and other audiences in the hope of
having inﬂuence or simply because such communication of science is regarded as
valuable in itself. The difference with the impact agenda in REF2104 is that this has
now been turned into an explicit performance requirement and engagement has been
reconceptualized as part of the ‘pathway to impact’. And although it is readily argued
that impact is complex and multifaceted, in fact the implicit epistemology is rather
simple: research is conducted; the researcher disseminates the research via forms of
engagement; and the research has an impact for which evidence can be collected (by the
researcher or her institution). This is what might be called the ‘billiard ball’ model of
impact, which posits an intuitive causal relationship between independent variables.
The problem with this model is that, except in very restricted settings, such as
cancer research noted above, it is not descriptive of a research dissemination process
that is far less determinate than policy documents make it seem. However, researchers
have dealt with the ‘epistemological’ problem of impact in a number of interesting
and, yes, creative ways. In essence, they have transformed the problem of the inde-
terminacy of evidence of impact into a determinate one in a clever way. In short, they
have created their own evidence. The more digniﬁed label for this is ‘solicited testi-
mony’, which is recognized as a legitimate form of evidence collection in evaluation
studies. In essence, the researcher seeks testimony from identiﬁed users of her research
who kindly conﬁrm that they have been ‘impacted’ by it.
The device of solicited testimony is attractive for many reasons. First, by deﬁni-
tion, evidential traces of impact – if they exist – lie beyond the ﬁeld of academia,
making them costly to discover. Indeed, many UK researchers realized that deter-
mining the impact of their research was itself a complex research project in need of
(non-existent) resources. Solicited testimony is attractive from this point of view as a
low-cost evidence form, easily collected from willing respondents. Second, solicited
testimony solves the well-known problem of causal attribution when impacts are
likely to be an outcome of many different factors. By deﬁnition, the testimony con-
structs the causal link between the research and the claimed impact, subject to the
testimony itself being legitimate and from a trustworthy and independent source.
Third, and this is perhaps a more subtle aspect of solicited testimony, the process of
solicitation constructs both the trace of impact in the form of a statement to the effect
that such and such happened as a result of the research and also the research
‘impactee’ itself as a new category of agent. Fourth, and relatedly, solicited testimony
makes research impact auditable by providing a trace of the impact that is easily
documented.7 In particular, solicited testimony epitomizes a strategy whereby
external sources of evidence are interiorized by the impact accounting process.
In general, this process requires that traces of impact outside the academy are
appropriated and edited in order to support the claims of impact.
It should not be assumed that this ‘constructivist’ view of the relation between
research, impact and impactees implies that impact is easy to audit or evaluate.
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On the contrary, evaluators expressed concerns about the over-use of solicited
testimony as an evidence form and stated that: ‘it was hard to assess the signiﬁcance
of an impact where the evidence was ‘nuanced’ and in the form of corroborating
testimonials’.8 So the ICS ﬁeld does not reveal a regulatory style that is conﬁdent in its
ability to evaluate.
In summary, the case of solicited testimony points to the more general pheno-
menon that new performance and accounting requirements generate creative strate-
gies by those held to account. The policy object of ‘impact’ has been operationalized
and accounted for in a very speciﬁc way. The pure model of pathways to eventual
impact was largely just that – a model or idea that was both impossible to realize and
which provided a misleading epistemology. Yet this implies that academics somehow
took control of the research impact agenda and simply shaped it for their own
purposes. As discussed below, this was not quite the case.
Quantifying Qualities?
Despite initial ambitions for a metrics-based system, the impact accounting require-
ment in the UK was non-quantitative in spirit because the basic unit of account was
the ICS. The early pilot studies conducted by the UK regulator revealed that a case
study approach was the best operationalization of the demand to demonstrate
impact. Hence, although the new requirement is motivated by a desire to measure
impact, it does not end up as a tyranny of numerical ‘transparency’.9
However, if the ICS as the unit of account is not itself metrics-based it nevertheless
feeds an evaluation system that produces a grade score for each ICS. In turn, the
aggregate scores can be combined in many different ways to form grade point
averages (GPAs) for subject areas and for universities. And, as noted above, these
GPAs enabled external agencies, such as newspapers, to construct rankings of
various kinds for impact.
This chain of transformation from the ICS to grading to ranking raises some
interesting questions about the point in accounting systems at which qualities get
transformed into quantities for further combination and aggregation. Sociologists
tend to focus on the metrics themselves and their effects on organizational actors.10
This reveals a tendency to ignore the qualitative pre-construction and pre-reduction
that makes that quantiﬁcation of qualities possible. In the case of impact accounting
this took a number of forms. First, the format of the ICS was tightly prescribed in
terms of sections and each section had a prescribed word count. So, although the ICS
was strictly qualitative in form it was nevertheless precisely speciﬁed in a way that
would enable the evaluation and grading process. Second, this pre-reduction of the
ICS was also facilitated by weakening the ownership of academics and using
journalists to edit and write the case studies in an accessible way, simplifying claims
that academics would, by virtue of their training, tend to frame modestly and with
caveats. Indeed, ICSs are designed for immodesty.
Overall, the ICS is a hybrid accounting document which is pre-constructed to
enable a metric, a score, to be attributed to it. Even academics who wholly embraced
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the research impact agenda, who considered themselves to be highly impactful, and
who had extensive evidence of that impact, would nevertheless experience the
ICS as a highly constrained ‘accounting’ form. This is not very surprising – to be
effective all forms of accounting are necessarily reductive and standardizing in order
that that the accounting process can be practical. In terms of reducing complexity and
nuance, the ICS is more quantitative than it appears on the surface. The ICS is a
servant of metrics.
Impact Creep?
Formally, the requirement for UK universities to demonstrate the impact of their
research is limited in scope. Not all research is required to be impactful and relatively
few members of the research population (approximately 1 in 9 as noted above)
produced ICSs. Yet we should not expect the impact agenda to remain contained in
this way, particularly as it will continue to ﬁnd favour with UK state funding agencies
who are likely to press for an increase in scope.
Whereas, for the REF2014, UK universities had to react to a new requirement and
develop the capability ad hoc, since that time they have begun to build ‘impact
infrastructures’ and academics are being supported by newly appointed impact
ofﬁcers and new devices such as ‘impact trackers’. In short, universities are building
support structures for the collection of evidence of research impact. In this way the
impact agenda is being hard-wired into organizational routines and processes.
As a result, impact issues will become increasingly difﬁcult for all academics to avoid
and ignore.
A related feature of the ‘impactization’ of the UK research landscape concerns the
shift in impact from an outcome to a performance target. For the 2014 impact
evaluation, the research being evaluated for impact had not been conducted with the
explicit intention of having impact. In addition, the evaluation allowed for long
gestation periods for research to have impact within a speciﬁc time window. So, for
example, something written in 1997 with, say, a demonstrable impact on UK policy
thinking in 2010 was unlikely to have been written with such an impact in mind. The
impact was a fortuitous outcome that had to be discovered ex post.
In contrast, following the 2014 exercise, UK universities have turned impact into a
target. This means that researchers must begin to think of their research in terms of its
prospective impact and must plan to support this. Grant applications in many
countries have always required wider engagements and strategies for the commu-
nication of results by researchers. This is not new. What is new is the transformation
of such recognition of the social beneﬁt of research into the need to produce explicit
strategies for research to have impact. We know that accounting systems are not
neutral mirrors of activity, and we know Goodhart’s law, which states that measures
cease to be good measures when they become targets. Is this happening to UK
academics in the case of impact?
There are signals – albeit weak ones – that the impact requirement is indeed
changing behaviour and is likely to continue to do so. The ﬁrst signal arises from the
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changing time-frame for impact: so-called pathways to impact are becoming shorter.
Whereas the 2014 exercise allowed for a 17-year time-frame for impact, in fact most
studies operated with much shorter time-frames (5–6 years). Yet we would expect this
timescale to come down as researchers’ behaviour changes to manage impact more
explicitly as a condition of obtaining public funding. Indeed, there is the paradoxical
possibility that researchers will feel pressure to produce impact before or in parallel
with the research process itself. From this point of view, the so-called research outputs
themselves become a by-product of the impact, not the thing that drives it. Another
way of putting this is that, despite denials, there is underlying and unintended
pressure for research to become more advisory in nature.
A second issue can only be highlighted anecdotally and deserves more empirical
investigation. The impact agenda is changing ways of talking and ways of acting. Of
course, academics, like other social agents, are likely to adopt ironic attitudes to new
performance requirements, but as the word ‘impact’ crops up in conversations with
increasing frequency, attention may shift. And subtle shifts in discourse are known to
lead to changes in actions. Such changes are reinforced by research committees that
explicitly encourage new habits to track possible impact. Many academics are being
advised to log emails as potential sources of data that they might have discarded in
the past. Furthermore, the solicitation of testimony is being changed from a hastily
constructed effort to provide support for research impact into a form of continuous
activity and impact vigilance. This author heard recently that a published research
report with his colleagues had been used internally in a large corporation. A decade
ago this would have been a matter for passing interest; now there is a need to get more
evidence about the impact.
What are the consequences of this creeping ‘impactization’ of the research agenda?
At present one can only point to subtle shifts rather than large-scale changes. For
example, the impact agenda requires attention and that takes time that might be spent
in other ways. But the critical issue is whether the value attributed to impact will
discourage forms of research of a more fundamental nature where impact may not be
demonstrable at all or, at best, for many years. Conversely, will researchers gravitate
to issues where there is likely to be demonstrable impact over a short period of time,
typically in a direct advisory capacity? At stake in all this is the question of intellectual
risk-taking or, rather, designing the appropriate balance of risk-taking and
incrementalism in a research portfolio. Prima facie we can expect the UK impact
requirement to extend its inﬂuence over research, fund-raising and career
development.
Conclusion: Impact and Risk-taking in Research
It is well-known that universities are complex organizations with multiple goals
which require compromise and trade-offs. Not only are there trade-offs between
investments in research and teaching, but also, even within research-committed
institutions, there is complexity created by what have been called ‘multiple institu-
tional logics’.11 Put simplistically, it can be argued that research activity is subject to
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two different logics or ideal-typical value-orientations. One is that of autonomous,
curiosity-driven activity (‘science as vocation’), the other is that of use-value or
application. These logics have always been co-present, varying in their relative
strength across institution type and academic ﬁeld. However, the UK REF2014
represents not only a policy-driven recalibration of their relationship in favour
of use value, but also a reconceptualization of ‘use-value’ in terms of ‘impact’ as
discussed earlier.
Some disciplines, such as social work, have found in the impact agenda a basis for
reworking their disciplinary identity, others – such as the humanities – have found it
alien. This means that the effects of the ‘impact agenda’ are undoubtedly varied; there
is no single story to be told about UK academia. Indeed, while some see the impact
agenda in the UK as the next logical episode in the rationalization and managerial
control of academic work, others regard it as an overdue and legitimate policy
demand by states and taxpayers who are willing to take a bet on most research
funding, but require some evidence of beneﬁt in some cases. Yet the key question
from both points of view is how might the research impact agenda inﬂuence intel-
lectual risk-taking in research? What organizational and behavioural changes does it
bring about?
As discussed above, the simpliﬁed epistemology can be self-fulﬁlling where
researchers are incentivized to work on ‘easy-impact’ problems rather than the
complex kind of engagements involved in being a public intellectual who seeks to
inﬂuence public policy. The impact agenda is therefore not to be equated with
expanded public engagement and may even lead to the opposite. Second, this
self-fulﬁlling concept of impact is supported by an accounting document – the ICS –
which supports simpliﬁcation both for metrical grading and for auditability reasons.
Third, impact creep is likely by virtue of the creation of management infrastructures
and roles to ‘support’ impactful research.
However, we should be careful in concluding too strongly about the
‘impact of impact’. Not all apparent tendencies to a decline of intellectual risk-taking
should be laid at the door of the UK impact agenda. The worldwide
emergence of journal lists and rankings have created a kind of ‘top journal’ con-
servatism among many researchers. In short, careerist incentives among researchers
have resulted in a gravitation to journals which, by their central and established
position in a ﬁeld, ﬁnd it difﬁcult to be receptive to very novel kinds of
research, both in terms of method and results. Arguably, these forces of career
risk-management in academic life, if they exist, are longer established and more
powerful than those of the impact agenda. Intrinsic interest, peer group recognition
and publications in recognized high quality outlets are still very strong motivational
factors in research culture in UK universities. Being impactful outside the academy
does not yet have the status and prestige that other dimensions of performance
convey. UK universities may hope for impact but most continue to reward academic
journal publications.12
From this point of view, despite the arguments above, the requirement to
demonstrate impact in UK is still a minor dimension to be managed in an academic
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environment that is already inherently conservative. Furthermore, the institutional
demand for impact can be seen as a reaction based on policy perceptions that
academic life has become specialized and inward-looking in tight circles of peers. We
have seen efforts to disrupt this tendency to closed specialization in the emergence of
interdisciplinarity as a value, and the rise of impact is most likely a similar kind of
reaction. In short, it is arguable that risk-taking in research has been a problem long
before the appearance of an impact agenda, which is more symptom than cause of
intellectual conservatism.
Finally, one seemingly puzzling feature of the UK impact agenda deserves
mention. Contrary to expectations, being an intellectual who is engaged in
public policy and frequently appears on TV (the ‘media Don’) is increasingly regar-
ded with suspicion on two counts. First, such an individual deviates from
the journal-focused academic validation system and, second, they are not
impactful academics who can deﬁne impact very precisely, and manage it
into existence over short time-frames via a process in which research and advice are
blurred. From this point of view, the UK research impact agenda is not a new
risk to creativity in academic life as noted above, but it may well be a risk to
a style of public policy engagement by academics that values collective discussion
over impact.
References and Notes
1. T. Kuhn (1970) The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago).
2. F. Narin, K. Hamilton and D. Olivastro (1997) The increasing
linkage between US technology and public science. Research Policy, 26,
pp. 317–330.
3. Warry Report (2006) Increasing the Economic Impact of Research Councils:
Advice to the Director General of Science and Innovation from the Research
Council Economic Impact Group (London: BIS).
4. See M. Power (2015) How accounting begins: object formation and the accretion




7. M. Power (1996) Making things auditable. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 21(2/3), pp. 289–315.
8. See Technopolis Ltd. (2010) REF Research Impact Pilot Exercise: Lessons
Learned Project: Feedback on Pilot Submissions. London, November.
9. M. Strathern (2000) The tyranny of transparency. British Education Research
Journal, 26(3), pp. 309–321.
10. W. Espeland andM. Stevens (1998) Commensuration as a social process.Annual
Review of Sociology, 24, pp. 313–343.
11. R. Greenwood, M. Raynard, F. Kodeih, E.R. Micelotta and M. Lounsbury
(2011) Institutional complexity and organizational responses. The Academy of
Management Annals, 5, pp. 317–371.
12. S. Kerr (1975) On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. The Academy of
Management Journal, 18(4), pp. 769–783.
Creativity, Risk and the Research Impact Agenda in the UK S33
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798717000515
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library, London School of Economics, on 02 May 2018 at 10:09:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
About the Author
Michael Power is Professor of Accounting at the London School of Economics and a
Fellow of the British Academy. His research and teaching focus on regulation,
accounting, auditing, internal control, risk management and organization theory. His
major works include: The Audit Society: Rituals of Veriﬁcation (Oxford University
Press, 1997);Organized Uncertainty: Designing aWorld of RiskManagement (Oxford
University Press, 2007) and Riskwork: Essays on the Organizational Life of Risk
Management (Oxford University Press, 2016).
S34 Michael Power
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798717000515
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Library, London School of Economics, on 02 May 2018 at 10:09:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
